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Exploiting software-defined networking techniques, randomly and instantly mutating routes can disguise strategically important
infrastructure and protect the integrity of data networks. Route mutation has been to date formulated as NP-complete constraint
satisfaction problem where feasible sets of routes need to be generated with exponential computational complexities, limiting
algorithmic scalability to large-scale networks. In this paper, we propose a novel node-centric route mutation method which
interprets route mutation as a signature matching problem. We formulate the route mutation problem as a three-dimensional
earth mover’s distance (EMD) model and solve it by using a binary branch and bound method. Considering the scalability, we
further propose that a heuristic method yields significantly lower computational complexities with marginal loss of robustness
against eavesdropping. Simulation results show that our proposed methods can effectively disguise key infrastructure by reducing
the difference of historically accumulative traffic among different switches. With significantly reduced complexities, our algorithms
are of particular interest to safeguard large-scale networks.
1. Introduction
Instantly mutating route is a promising technique to provide
the integrity of large data networks [1]. It can disguise
strategically located important network infrastructures and
delay or prevent potential reconnaissance attacks [2]. This is
of particular interest to many practical networks delivering
security-sensitive data, such as military networks [3] and
banking systems [4]. On the other hand, software-defined
network (SDN) has been increasingly deployed. Centralized
control in SDN facilitates mutating routes to disguise the
strategically important switches and protect the network.
In general, route mutation is NP-complete constrained
path selection in the presence of quality-of-service (QoS)
consideration [5]. It has been formulated to be a constraint
satisfaction problem and solved by using the satisfiability
modulo theory (SMT) [6]. The constraints include the QoS
of traffic flows and physical bandwidth of routers [6]. The
final routes are randomly chosen from the results of SMT
that satisfy constraints. However, the routes can hardly claim
optimality in any sense, and the complexity of SMT is
prohibitively high [7]. Although some heuristics have been
developed to solve this problem within pseudo-polynomial-
time [8–11], these algorithms concern network optimality
rather than security.
In this paper, we propose new node-centric route muta-
tion methods which are able to effectively change routes of
flows at substantially reduced complexities. The key idea is
that we propose interpreting route mutation as a signature
matching problem and developing a three-dimensional earth
mover’s distance (EMD) model with network connectivity
and QoS constraints to suppress the traffic difference among
switches. Another important aspect of our algorithm is
that we solve the new node-centric problem as a three-
dimensional transportation problem and develop suboptimal
algorithms with polynomial time-complexities. Simulation
results show that our algorithms are able to suppress the
traffic difference among strategically important switches and
also achieve fast convergence with substantially reduced
complexities.
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The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents related work. Section 3 describes the system and
network model. In Section 4, we discuss the details of
designed algorithm. We present the computational efficient
heuristics that can apply to large-scale networks in Section 5.
Section 6 evaluates the experiment results and performance
of our algorithm. In Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2. Related Work
In [12], randomly mutating route or host address was pro-
posed to protect key network infrastructures from exposure
to attackers and prevent potential attacks. Only a few struc-
tured algorithms have been designed for route or host address
mutation, all of which formulated NP-complete constrained
satisfaction problems under the constraints of the mutation
rate [13], the address range [14], and the range distribution for
host address mutation [6, 15]. These algorithms were solved
by using SMT [6, 13–15]. However, constraint satisfaction
problems are NP-complete with exponential complexities
[16]. As far as the routing problem is concerned, there are𝑁 =∑𝑛−1𝑗=1 ((𝑛−2)!/(𝑛−𝑗−1)!) possible routes with lengths shorter
than 𝑗 hops in an 𝑛-node complete network [17]. Choosing 𝑘
routes out of𝑁 yields a complexity of𝑁!/(𝑁−𝑘)!𝑘!, limiting
the scalability of the designs to large-scale networks.
More efforts have been spent demonstrating the concept
of route mutations. Route mutation was first implemented
under IPv6, referred to as “Moving Target IPv6 Defense
(MT6D),” by continually rotating the IPv6 addresses between
the senders and recipients [18]. A new transport layer
protocol was designed to enable multiple addresses per
network socket and support the rotations of IPv6 addresses
[19]. Route mutation was later applied to mobile ad hoc
networks [20], by repurposing a classic attack mechanism,
the Sybil attack, for effective defense. Most recently, route
mutationwas demonstrated using Cisco’s SDNplatform,One
Platform Kit [21]. With the flexibility of SDN, a deception
system that mutates the topologies virtually was proposed
to defend against reconnaissances [22]. A double hopping
communication approach was designed to combine the IP
address mutation and the route mutation methods in SDN
[23], in which routes were selected from all paths within
even lengths between sources and destinations. Game theory
was adopted for route mutation in [24]. Route mutation
was proposed to apply to traditional networks where links
were selected using stochastic game routing policies of
next-hop probability distribution. In [25], a virtual network
embedding framework was proposed to satisfy the capacity,
delay, and cycle-free constraintswhenmutating links by game
theoretic routing policies. In [1], a randomized multipath
routingmethodwas developed to circumvent black holes and
minimize the overall energy consumption in wireless sensor
networks.
3. System Model
Figure 1 illustrates the software-defined network under con-
sideration, where there are𝑁 number of switches connected
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Figure 1: An illustration of SDN topology.
in a network topology and forwarding traffic. We assume
that all the switches are connected to a SDN controller in
a star topology. The SDN controller is responsible for route
discovery and mutation. The switches forward traffic along
the routes specified by the SDN controller. The bandwidth of
each switch, that is, switch 𝑖, is 𝐵𝑖.
Each of the switches is also connected to end-hosts which
generate routing requests through the switch to the SDN
controller. An end-host can request sending traffic flows
to any other end-host. Each traffic flow is assumed to be
randomly generated and last for a certain period of time.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are at most𝐾
routing requests at any instant. The data rate of the 𝑘th flow
is denoted by 𝑓𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾).
Consider a practical network with hundreds of switches
and nontrivial topologies (as opposed to fully connected
complete graphs). Some of the switches have more connec-
tions than the others. These switches are strategically located
and handle more traffic than other switches. In the example
of Figure 1, switches 𝐷 and 𝐻 are such strategically located
nodes. The exposure of these switches to adversaries poses
critical threats to the integrity of the network.
The topology of the network can be described by an
undirected graph 𝐺(N,E), where N collects the vertexes
(i.e., switches) and E collects the edges (i.e., the links
connecting the switches).The size ofN is |N| = 𝑁, where | ⋅ |
stands for cardinality. Also defineA to be the adjacent matrix
of 𝐺. A(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 (𝑖 ̸= 𝑗), if vertices 𝑖 and 𝑗 are connected; or
A(𝑖, 𝑗) = 0, otherwise.
Reconnaissance attacks [26] are considered, where an
adversary keeps monitoring (or eavesdropping) the switches
until strategically located switches are identified and attacks
(such as DDoS) are initiated. The difference of historically
accumulative traffic among switches is typically used by
the adversary to identify strategically located switches, for
example, 𝐷 and 𝐻 in Figure 1. The exposure of the strategi-
cally located switches would facilitate the potential attacks.
Consider the worst-case scenario that the adversary is able
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Figure 2: Illustrations of multihop detours around a strategically located node, say node 𝐵 in this example, where the lengths of the detours
are 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
to access each individual switch, install invasive software,
accumulate the traffic volume handled at the switch, and
collect the traffic volumes of all the switches. In practice,
this can be implemented by remotely installing monitoring
software, such as Cacti [27], to get the switches to collect and
report the SNMP information to the adversary.
4. The Proposed Route Mutation for
Large-Scale Networks
In this section, we propose mutating routes on a node basis
to leverage between the robustness against reconnaissance
attacks and the computational complexity. Particularly, rout-
ing requests from end-hosts are responded to independently
from one another using classical routing techniques, such as
OSPF [28]. The exponentially increasing complexity of joint
routing, such as the one proposed in [6], can be avoided.
Given the routes, we propose that the SDN controller
identifies historically heavily loaded nodes with high expo-
sure risks and detours their traffic flows via other historically
lightly loaded nodes. A node is identified to be historically
heavily or lightly loaded, based on the accumulative traffic
of the node. By this means, the strategically located nodes
can be disguised and protected, delaying or even preventing
potential attacks.
The detours bypassing a historically heavily loaded node
can be multihop. Figure 2 gives the examples of two-, three-,
and four-hop detours that are considered, where node 𝐵 is a
strategically located node. The possible detours for a traffic
flow currently passing node 𝐵 must connect the nodes one
hop away from node 𝐵 along the traffic flow, that is, nodes 𝐴
and𝐶. Such detours can be readily obtained using depth-first
search (i.e., search for the closed loops passing node 𝐵) [29].
The lengths of the detours are 2, 3, and 4 (in numbers of hops)
in Figures 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), respectively.
We also propose interpreting the route mutation as a
signature matching problem. The accumulative traffic loads
of the nodes are visualized as a signature, and routes are
mutated to conform the signature to the one with even loads
across all the nodes. Widely used to measure the difference
of two images [30], EMD [31] is extended to measure
the difference between the two signatures. The difference,
or more specifically, the EMD, is reduced recursively by
detouring flows around historically heavily loaded nodes, as
described earlier.
The proposed route mutation is able to substantially
reduce the computationally complexity. Assume that the
detours are limited to two hops.The worst-case complexity is
O(𝑛22𝑛), consisting of detour discovery for every switch and
redirecting at most 𝐾 traffic flows from every switch, where𝑛 represents for the number of variables. In this case, 𝑛 ⩽𝐾𝑁(𝑁−3). In contrast, the state-of-the-art joint mutation of
all routing paths, using SMT [6], would result in prohibitive
exponential complexity and limited scalability to networks
with hundreds of nodes.
4.1. Nodewise RouteMutation for Delay-Tolerant Traffic. First
consider delay-tolerant traffic. The total number of current
traffic flows is 𝐾, consisting of existing ongoing flows col-
lected in the setK𝑒 and new flows collected in the setK𝑛.
K =K𝑒 ∪K𝑛. 𝐾 = |K|. Denote V󸀠𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ N, and V󸀠 (in bytes)
to be the accumulative traffic of each individual node 𝑖 and
their average, respectively, before a round of route mutation.
V󸀠 = (1/𝑁)∑𝑁𝑖=1 V󸀠𝑖 . V𝑖 and V are the accumulative traffic of
node 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ N, and the average, respectively, after the round
of route mutation. V = (1/𝑁)∑𝑁𝑖=1 V𝑖.
The proposed route mutation redirects the 𝐾 traffic
flows, attempting to conform the pictorial signature of the
accumulative traffic of the nodes to a uniform signature with
even traffic of V at every node. To do this, we construct
two signatures, that is, two one-dimensional distributions:{V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈ N} and {V − V󸀠𝑗, ∀𝑗 ∈ N}. The first signature{V𝑖−V󸀠𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ∈N} provides the traffic volumes that can detour.
The second signature {V − V󸀠𝑗, ∀𝑗 ∈ N} denotes the demand
of each node to achieve traffic uniformity among the nodes,
as illustrated in Figure 3.
The EMD can be defined to quantify the difference
between the two signatures, as given by𝜖∗ = argmin
𝜖(𝜏)
𝜏, (1a)
𝜖 (𝜏)
= ( ∑𝑖∈N ∑𝐾𝑘=1 ∑𝑅𝑟=1 ∑j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘) 𝑐𝑖j𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘
min (𝑅∑𝑖∈N (V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖) , ∑𝑗∈N [V − V󸀠𝑗]+) − 𝜏) ,
(1b)
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(a) Historically accumulative traffic volumes of nodes whenAlgorithm 1
starts
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(b) Historically accumulative traffic volumes of nodes before Algo-
rithm 1 terminates
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(c) Historically accumulative traffic volumes of nodes after Algorithm 1
terminates
Figure 3:An illustration of the proposed application of signaturematching to routemutation, where V𝑗 and V
󸀠
𝑗 are the historically accumulative
traffic volumes of node 𝑖 at the current and the previous instants, respectively, and V and V󸀠 are the averages of the historically accumulative
traffic volumes at the current and the previous instants, respectively. V󸀠𝑖 and V
󸀠 are the results of the route mutation at the previous instant. V𝑖
and V are the values before the current route mutation is executed.
where [⋅]+ = max(⋅, 0); 𝑅 is the maximum allowed length of a
detour (in numbers of hops); 𝑥𝑖j𝑘 = 1 if the current flow 𝑘 is
to be offloaded from node 𝑖 to detour j, or 𝑥𝑖j𝑘 = 0, otherwise;𝜃𝑖𝑘 = 1, if flow 𝑘 currently goes through node 𝑖, or 𝜃𝑖𝑘 = 0,
otherwise; 𝛿𝑗j is given by
𝛿𝑗j = {{{
1, if 𝑗 ∈ j;
0, otherwise. (2)
L𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘) is the set of detours with length of 𝑟 ≤ 𝑅, and each
of the detours connects to the two nodes one hop away from
node 𝑖 along the current route of flow 𝑘. For any j ∈L𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘),
j ∈ N𝑟×1; that is, |j| = 𝑟. Let j𝑙 (𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑟) denote the 𝑙th
element of j. We have A(j1, j2) = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = A(j𝑟−1, j𝑟) = 1.
Here, 𝑐𝑖j is the cost of offloading traffic flows from node𝑖 to detour j ∈ L𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘). Keep in mind that our goal is
to minimize the difference of accumulative traffic among
the nodes. Meanwhile, the EMD is inherently defined to
minimize the difference. For this reason, 𝑐𝑖j is defined as the
normalized total difference of node 𝑖 and detour j from V, as
specified by
𝑐𝑖j = √ 1𝑟 + 1 ((V𝑖 − V)2 +∑𝑗∈j (V𝑗 − V)
2)
for j ∈ N𝑟×1.
(3)
Our EMD has a different form to the conventional
definition for image processing applications [31]. An auxiliary
Security and Communication Networks 5
variable 𝜏 is defined to indicate the gap between the total
traffic load that is expected to detour and the total traffic
that can detour, whereas there is no such gap for image
applications.This is due to the fact that route mutation (or, in
other words, route reselection) is discrete and these two loads
do not equate in most cases. (1a) and (1b) provide the average
cost to minimize the difference between the total traffic load
expected to be detoured and the total traffic load that can be
detoured.
Predicted before a round of mutation, V is unnecessarily
equal to the one actually achieved after the mutation. This is
due to the dependence of traffic between the nodes imposed
by traffic flows. Particularly, a detour needs to be taken across
multiple nodes and increases the traffic of the nodes evenly.
Therefore, the average traffic load is expected to increase
as a result of mutation. However, the difference of V before
and after a round of mutation can be iteratively reduced by
increasing the rounds and diminishes as the routes stabilize.
Once stabilized, the routes are implemented into the network.
The convergence of the iterations can be guaranteed, since
V does not decrease during the iterations while it is also
obviously bounded. Figure 3 gives a detailed illustration on
our signature matching method.
Given V󸀠𝑗, V
󸀠, V𝑗, and V, we can formulate a binary linear
programming problem to minimize the EMD of the two
signatures, as given by
min
𝑥𝑖j𝑘 ,𝜏,∀(𝑖,𝑘)∈S
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
(∑
𝑖∈N
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑐𝑖j𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘) , (4a)
s.t.
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘 ≤ 1, for any 𝑘; (4b)
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘 ≤ V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖 ,
for any 𝑖 ∈N;
(4c)
∑
𝑖∈N
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝛿𝑗j𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘
≤ [V − V󸀠𝑗]+ , for any 𝑗 ∈N;
(4d)
min (𝑅∑
𝑖∈N
(V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖) , ∑
𝑗∈N
[V − V󸀠𝑗]+)
− ∑
𝑖∈N
∑
𝑗∈N
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝛿𝑗j𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘
≤ 𝜏;
(4e)
𝑥𝑖j𝑘 ∈ {0, 1} , (4f)
where S is the set of nodes that can be detoured. S needs to
be preselected so that at most one of two consecutive nodes
along a traffic flow, for example, nodes 𝐵 and 𝐶 in Figure 2,
detours. This is to prevent L𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘) from changing during
solving (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f). We can label the
nodes along a traffic flow before running (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d),
(4e), and (4f).S can be first set to collect the nodes with even
labels and input to (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f). Then
S is reset to collect the remaining nodes with odd labels to
run (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) again.
Here, constraint (4b) restricts a flow that can only be
offloaded from a node to one detour; (4c) and (4d) restrict
the amounts of traffic that can be supplied and demanded by
the first and the second signatures, respectively; (4e) specifies
the total maximum traffic amount that can detour; and (4f)
specifies the variables to be binary.
Given 𝜏, (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) are integer
linear program and can be optimally solved using a branch
and bound/cut algorithm [32]. Specifically, we first relax
(4f) and evaluate the upper and lower bounds of (4a) by
increasingly setting the variables to “0” or “1” and using the
Simplex method [33] to optimize the remaining variables. At
any instant, the settings whose lower bounds are higher than
the upper bound of another setting are discarded. The final
remaining integer results are the solution for (4a), (4b), (4c),
(4d), (4e), and (4f).
A bisectionmethod can be taken to recursively search for
the minimum feasible value of 𝜏. When 𝜏 is too small, (4a),
(4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) can become infeasible. When𝜏 is large, (4e) becomes inactive and (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d),
(4e), and (4f) becomes always feasible. To this end, (4a), (4b),
(4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) is an on-off function of 𝜏 preserving
monotonicity and can be readily solved bisectionally.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed route mutation,
where 𝜖 ≪ 1 is a predetermined positive threshold for
the termination of the algorithm. This algorithm resides in
the SDN controller and runs periodically or on-demand. As
described, the kernel of the algorithm is the EMD problem
(4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) solved using the binary
branch and bound/cut method in Step (11). The optimal
solution for (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) is used to
update 𝜃𝑖𝑘, or, in other words, to find the detours of the routes,
as depicted in Step (12). By repeating these steps, the existing
routes gradually move away and increase lengths, until the
uniformity of all the nodes as regards accumulative traffic
cannot be further improved; see the loop from Steps (2) to
(13).
The majority of the complexity in Algorithm 1 lies in
Step (11), that is, binary branch and bound/cut. Given a
network𝐺(N,E), we can precompute all possible loops using
depth-first search. Consider the worst-case scenario where
the network is a complete graph. Let 𝐿 denote the maximum
number of detours that a node can take, and 𝐿 = 𝑁 − 3 +∑𝑅𝑟=2((𝑁 − 3)!/2(𝑁 − 3 − 𝑟)!), where 𝑟 is the length of detours
in node numbers. As a result, the complexity of Steps (3) to
(9) is O(𝐾𝑁𝐿). In the best-case and worst-case of branch
and bound/cut, the members of branches are ∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝑘 and∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝑘2𝑘, respectively, where 𝑛 = 𝐾𝑁𝐿. As per each branch,
the complexity is O(min(𝑚2, 𝑛2)), where 𝑚 is the number of
constraints [34, 35]. 𝑚 ⩾ 𝑛, as (4f) limits each variable to be
smaller than 1. Thus, the complexity is O(𝑛2). As a result, the
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Input: 𝐺(N,E); A; 𝑅; the accumulative traffic of each node
V󸀠𝑖 ; the current route of each flow 𝑘 ∈K; 𝑓𝑘; and the
initial 𝜃𝑖𝑘 (𝑖 ∈N; 𝑘 ∈K).
Output: 𝜃𝑖𝑘, ∀𝑖 ∈N, 𝑘 ∈K
(1) Let V𝑖 = V󸀠𝑖 + ∑𝑘∈K 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘.
(2) repeat
(3) for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 do
(4) for 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾 do
(5) if 𝜃𝑖𝑘 = 1 then
(6) constructL𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘), 𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅, using depth-first search, and calculate 𝛿𝑗j.
(7) end if
(8) end for
(9) end for
(10) calculate V = (1/𝑁)∑𝑁𝑖=1 V𝑖, and 𝑐𝑖j using (3);
(11) substitute V𝑖, V, V
󸀠
𝑖 (𝑖 ∈N), V󸀠, 𝑐𝑖j and 𝜃𝑖𝑘 into the EMD problem (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f),
and solve the problem optimally using the binary branch and bound/cut method;
(12) update
𝜃𝑖𝑘 ←󳨀 ∑
𝑗∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑗,𝑘)
𝜃𝑗𝑘𝛿𝑖j𝑥𝑗i𝑘;
V𝑖 ←󳨀 V󸀠𝑖 + ∑
𝑘∈K
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘;(𝑖 ∈N; 𝑘 ∈K)
(13) until 𝜃𝑖𝑘 stops changing; or in other words, |ΔV| ≤ 𝜖.
Algorithm 1: Route mutation for delay-tolerant traffic.
lower bound complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(𝑛2)O(∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝑘) =
O(𝐾4𝑁4𝐿4), and the upper bound is O(𝐾2𝑁2𝐿2∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝑘2𝑘) =
O(𝐾2𝑁2𝐿22𝐾𝑁𝐿).
4.2. Route Mutation for Delay-Bounded Traffic. Algorithm 1
can be extended to the case with QoS constraints on traffic
flows. For illustration convenience, we assume that the QoS
requirement of a traffic flow, say flow, is characterized by the
maximum allowed route length of the flow, denoted by 𝐿𝑘
(in numbers of hops). To this end, the following constraint
is added to (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f):
∑
𝑖∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑟𝑥𝑖j𝑘 ≤ Δ𝑙𝑘, for any 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾, (5)
where Δ𝑙𝑘 = 𝐿𝑘 − 𝑙𝑘. 𝑙𝑘 is the route length of traffic flow 𝑘 ∈
K𝑒 or is the length of the route discovered using OPSF for a
new flow 𝑘 ∈ K𝑛. Equation (5) limits the total length of the
detours that each flow 𝑘 can take.
The finite bandwidth of switches can also be considered
in the proposed algorithm. We can incorporate a new
constraint of the bandwidth of each link into a node-centric
optimization problem, as shown as follows:
𝐵𝑖 = min {𝐵 (𝑖, 𝑢) , for any 𝑢 ∈N, A (𝑖, 𝑢) = 1} ; (6a)
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘 − ∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘
+ ∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑁∑
𝑗=1
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝛿𝑖j𝜃𝑗𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑗j𝑘 ≤ 𝐵𝑖,
for any 𝑖 ∈N,
(6b)
where 𝐵(𝑖, 𝑢) denotes the maximum bandwidth of link (𝑖, 𝑢),
and 𝑢 is connected to node 𝑖 in one hop; that is, A(𝑖, 𝑢) =1. For any node 𝑖 in the network, 𝐵𝑖 denotes the link
bandwidth, which is computed as the minimum one among
all bandwidths of the links connecting node 𝑖. ∑𝐾𝑘=1 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘
accounts for the traffic load of node 𝑖 beforemutation; afterwe
mutate the flows out of node 𝑖, that is,∑j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)∑𝐾𝑘=1 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘,
and move flows to it, that is, ∑j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)∑𝑁𝑗=1∑𝐾𝑘=1 𝛿𝑖j𝜃𝑗𝑘𝑓𝑘𝑥𝑗j𝑘,
its traffic load is within the range of 𝑏𝑖.
In practice, the maximum number of flow entries on an
SDN switch is limited by the physical resources of the switch,
such as CAM and SRAM. We can add constraint (7) into
Algorithm 1 to restrain the maximum number of flow rules
that the switches can install. Without loss of generality, we
denote the average size of a flow rule as 𝑎. The number of
flow rules at each switch depends on the total number of flows
passing through it, as given by
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜃𝑖𝑘 − ∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑥𝑖j𝑘 + ∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑁∑
𝑗=1
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝛿𝑖j𝜃𝑗𝑘𝑥𝑗j𝑘
≤ 𝑡𝑖𝑎 , for any 𝑖 ∈N,
(7)
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Input: 𝐺(N,E); A; 𝑅; the accumulative traffic of each node
V󸀠𝑖 ; the current route of each flow 𝑘 ∈K; 𝑓𝑘; the initial𝜃𝑖𝑘; 𝐿𝑘; and the initial 𝑙𝑘 (𝑖 ∈N; 𝑘 ∈K).
Output: 𝜃𝑖𝑘, ∀𝑖 ∈N, 𝑘 ∈K
(1) Let V𝑖 = V󸀠𝑖 + ∑𝑘∈K 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘 and Δ𝑙𝑘 = 𝐿𝑘 − 𝑙𝑘.
(2) repeat
(3) Run Steps (3) to (10) of Algorithm 1.
(4) substitute V𝑖, V, V
󸀠
𝑖 (𝑖 ∈N), V󸀠, 𝑐𝑖j, 𝜃𝑖𝑘 and Δ𝑙𝑘 into the EMD problem (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f)
incorporating (5), and solve the problem optimally using the binary branch and bound/cut method;
(5) update
𝜃𝑖𝑘 ←󳨀 ∑
𝑗∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑗,𝑘)
𝜃𝑗𝑘𝛿𝑖j𝑥𝑗i𝑘;
V𝑖 ←󳨀 V󸀠𝑖 + ∑
𝑘∈K
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘;
Δ𝑙𝑘 ←󳨀 Δ𝑙𝑘 − ∑
𝑖∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑟𝑥𝑖j𝑘;
(𝑖 ∈N; 𝑘 ∈K)
(6) until 𝜃𝑖𝑘 stops changing; or in other words, |ΔV| ≤ 𝜖.
Algorithm 2: Route mutation for delay-bounded traffic.
where, for any switch 𝑖 in the network, the size of its flow table
is bounded by 𝑡𝑖. Thus, the maximum number of flow entries
that a switch can install is 𝑡𝑖/𝑎.The left-hand side of inequality
(7) shows the number of flow rules of switch 𝑖 after mutation,
which is bounded by 𝑡𝑖/𝑎.
GivenΔ𝑙𝑘 and the constraints (5), (6a), (6b), and (7), (4a),
(4b), (4c), (4d), (4e), and (4f) can be optimally solved using
binary branch and bound/cut in the same way, as described
in Algorithm 1. After that, both V and 𝑙𝑘 need to be updated
until 𝑙𝑘 cannot be further increased. Algorithm 2 summarizes
the proposed routemutation approach in the presence ofQoS
constraints. The key difference from Algorithm 1 is Step (4),
implementing (5), (6a), (6b), and (7). The only other changes
are in Steps (1) and (5), where Δ𝑙𝑘 is initialized and updated,
respectively.
5. Computationally Efficient Heuristics
As described in Section 4, binary linear programming
is formulated and the binary branch and bound/cut
method is required. This has the worst-case complexity of
O(min(𝑚2, 𝑛2) ∑𝑛𝑘=1 𝑘2𝑘).
In this section, we propose a simplified version of Algo-
rithms 1 and 2, which decouples traffic allocation and flow
selection into two concatenated subproblems.The traffic allo-
cation can be formulated as a linear programming transporta-
tion problem. The flow selection can be achieved by using
the aforementioned binary branch and bound/cut algorithm,
but with a substantially smaller number of variables, that is,
less than 𝐾. As a result, the complexity can be significantly
reduced to the complexity of solving (8a), (8b), (8c), and (8d).
First consider delay-tolerant traffic. We begin with opti-
mizing the total traffic 𝑦𝑖j, 𝑖 ∈ N, j ∈ ⋃𝑅𝑟=1(⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘)),
which needs to move from one of the nodes, that is, node𝑖, to a detour, that is, detour j (𝑖 ∉ j). Following the EMD
criterion, a linear programming problem can be formulated
to determine the total traffic that needs to detour from the
heavily loaded nodes, as given by
min
𝑦𝑖j ,
∀𝑖∈S,j
(∑
𝑖∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑐𝑖j𝑦𝑖j) , (8a)
s.t.
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑦𝑖j ≤ V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖 , for any 𝑖 ∈N; (8b)
∑
𝑖∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝛿𝑗j𝑦𝑖j ≤ [V − V󸀠𝑗]+ ,
for any 𝑗 ∈N;
(8c)
min (𝑅∑
𝑖∈N
(V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖) , ∑
𝑗∈N
[V − V󸀠𝑗]+)
− ∑
𝑖∈N
∑
𝑗∈N
𝑅∑
𝑟=1
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝛿𝑗j𝑦𝑖j ≤ 𝜏;
(8d)
which can be solved using the Simplex method [36]. The
optimal solution for (8a), (8b), (8c), and (8d) is denoted by{𝑦∗𝑖j , ∀𝑖 ∈ N; j ∈ ⋃𝑅𝑟=1(⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖, 𝑘))}, or {𝑦∗𝑖j } for short. A
bisection search can also be taken to identify the minimum
value of 𝜏 to preserve the feasibility of (8a), (8b), (8c), and
(8d).
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Input: 𝐺(N,E); A; 𝑅; the accumulative traffic of each node
V󸀠𝑖 ; the current route of each flow 𝑘 ∈K; 𝑓𝑘; and the
initial 𝜃𝑖𝑘 (𝑖 ∈N; 𝑘 ∈K).
Output: 𝜃𝑖𝑘, ∀𝑖 ∈N, 𝑘 ∈K
(1) Let V𝑖 = V󸀠𝑖 + ∑𝑘∈K 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘.
(2) repeat
(3) Run Steps (3) to (10) of Algorithm 1.
(4) substitute V𝑖, V, V
󸀠
𝑖 (𝑖 ∈N), V󸀠, and 𝑐𝑖j into (8a), (8b), (8c), and (8d), and solve the optimal
solution 𝑦∗𝑖j using the Simplex method;
(5) Arrange {V𝑖, ∀𝑖 ∈N} in decreasing order so that V𝜋(1) ≥ V𝜋(2) ≥ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ V𝜋(𝑁).
(6) for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 do
(7) Let Q = ⋃𝑅𝑟=1(⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝜋(𝑖), 𝑘)).
(8) repeat
(9) Let j∗ = minj∈Q((1/|j|) ∑𝑗∈j V𝑗);
(10) Offload traffic flows from node 𝜋(𝑖) to detour j∗ by solving (9) for 𝜙𝜋(𝑖)j∗𝑘, given 𝑦∗𝑖j ;
(11) Update
Q←󳨀 Q \ j∗;
V𝜋(𝑖) ←󳨀 V𝜋(𝑖) − 𝐾∑
𝑘=1
∑
𝑗∈j∗
𝜙𝜋(𝑖)j∗𝑘𝑓𝑘;
V𝑗 ←󳨀 V𝑗 + 𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜙𝜋(𝑖)j∗𝑘𝑓𝑘, ∀𝑗 ∈ j∗.
(12) until no traffic flow can be further offloaded from node 𝜋(𝑖), or Q = 0.
(13) end for
(14) until |ΔV| ≤ 𝜖 or 𝑦∗𝑖j = 0 ∀𝑖, j.
Algorithm 3: Heuristic route mutation for delay-tolerant traffic.
Given {𝑦∗𝑖j }, we proceed to select the traffic flows for
redirecting from node 𝑖 to detour j and formulate a binary
linear program, as given by
max
𝜙𝑖j𝑘 ,∀𝑘∈K
( 𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜙𝑖j𝑘𝑓𝑘) ,
s.t.
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜙𝑖j𝑘𝑓𝑘 ≤ 𝑦∗𝑖j ;
𝜙𝑖j𝑘 ∈ {0, 1} , ∀𝑘 ∈K,
(9)
which can be readily solved using binary branch and
bound/cut.
We start by offloading the traffic flows of the node with
max𝑖∈N(V𝑖). And (9) is used to offload the flows first to
the detour with minj∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L|j|(𝑖,𝑘)((1/|j|) ∑𝑗∈j V𝑗) and then to
the other detours in increasing order of (1/|j|) ∑𝑗∈j V𝑗. This
repeats for the other nodes in decreasing order of V𝑖.
Algorithm 3 summarizes the proposed computationally
efficient heuristic approach for route mutation under delay-
tolerant traffic. Steps (3) and (4) execute the traffic allocation,
following the EMD criterion and using (8a), (8b), (8c), and
(8d). Steps (5) to (13) conduct the flow selection, using (9).
These two parts concatenate to reduce the complexity.
The major complexity of Algorithm 3 lies in solving (8a),
(8b), (8c), (8d), and (9). Solving (8a), (8b), (8c), and (8d)
requires the complexity of O(min(𝑚2, 𝑑2)), as discussed in
Section 4.1, where 𝑚 = 2𝑁 + 1 here. In the worst-case
scenario with a complete graph, 𝑑 = 𝑁𝐿, where 𝐿 = 𝑁 −3 + ∑𝑅𝑟=2((𝑁 − 3)!/2(𝑁 − 3 − 𝑟)!), as given earlier, 𝑁 is
large, and the number of variables is larger than the number
of constraints. Therefore, the complexity of (8a), (8b), (8c),
and (8d) is O(𝑁2). Given each nonzero solution 𝑦∗𝑖j , (9)
implements branch and bound/cut.The best-case complexity
of solving (9) is O(𝑘4), where 𝑘 is the number of variables
in (9), and 𝑘 is substantially smaller than 𝐾. The worst-case
complexity is O(𝑘22𝑘). Suppose all of the solutions from (8a),
(8b), (8c), and (8d) are nonzero.The best-case and worst-case
complexities of Algorithm 3 are O(𝑘4𝑁2) and O(𝑘22𝑘𝑁2),
respectively.
Proceed with delay sensitive traffic, where the route
lengths of traffic flows are strictly bounded. Algorithm 3
can be readily extended to this case by evaluating the
route lengths on-the-go. The constraints of bandwidth and
switch capacity can also be considered in the same way in
Algorithm 2, as discussed in Section 4.2.
To be specific, we can attach (10) to (8a), (8b), (8c), and
(8d) to capture the bandwidth constraint.
V𝑖 − V󸀠𝑖 − ∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝑦𝑖j + ∑
𝑗∈N
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝛿𝑖j𝑦𝑗j ≤ 𝐵𝑖,
for any 𝑖 ∈N; (10)
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Input: 𝐺(N,E); A; 𝑅; the accumulative traffic of each node
V󸀠𝑖 ; the current route of each flow 𝑘 ∈K; 𝑓𝑘; the initial𝜃𝑖𝑘; 𝐿𝑘; and the initial 𝑙𝑘 (𝑖 ∈N; 𝑘 ∈K).
Output: 𝜃𝑖𝑘, ∀𝑖 ∈N, 𝑘 ∈K
(1) Let V𝑖 = V󸀠𝑖 + ∑𝑘∈K 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑓𝑘 and Δ𝑙𝑘 = 𝐿𝑘 − 𝑙𝑘.
(2) repeat
(3) Run Steps (3) to (5) of Algorithm 3
(4) for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 do
(5) Let Q = ⋃𝐾𝑘=1(⋃min(𝑅,Δ𝑙𝑘)𝑟=1 L𝑟(𝜋(𝑖), 𝑘)).
(6) repeat
(7) Run Steps (9) and (10) of Algorithm 3
(8) Update
Q←󳨀 Q \ j∗;
V𝜋(𝑖) ←󳨀 V𝜋(𝑖) − 𝐾∑
𝑘=1
∑
𝑗∈j∗
𝜙𝜋(𝑖)j∗𝑘𝑓𝑘;
V𝑗 ←󳨀 V𝑗 + 𝐾∑
𝑘=1
𝜙𝜋(𝑖)j∗𝑘𝑓𝑘, ∀𝑗 ∈ j∗;Δ𝑙𝑘 ←󳨀 Δ𝑙𝑘 − 𝜙𝜋(𝑖)j∗𝑘|j∗|, ∀𝑘 ∈K.
(9) until no traffic flow can be further offloaded from
node 𝜋(𝑖), or Q = 0.
(10) end for
(11) until |ΔV| ≤ 𝜖 or 𝑦∗𝑖j = 0 ∀𝑖, j.
Algorithm 4: Heuristic route mutation for delay-bounded traffic.
we can also add (11) to (9) to restrain the number of flow
entries per switch 𝑖.
∑
𝑘∈K
𝜃𝑖𝑘 − ∑
𝑘∈K
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
𝜃𝑖𝑘𝜙𝑖j𝑘
+ ∑
𝑗∈N
∑
j∈⋃𝐾𝑘=1L𝑟(𝑖,𝑘)
∑
𝑘∈K
𝛿𝑖j𝜃𝑗𝑘𝜙𝑗j𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝑖𝑎 ,
for any 𝑖 ∈N.
(11)
The extension is summarized in Algorithm 4, where only
the differences between the two algorithms are highlighted.
6. Simulation and Evaluation
In this section, simulations are carried out to evaluate
the proposed algorithms. We generate different random 𝑘-
regular graphs by using Python packageNetworkX (NX) [37],
where the degrees of all the nodes are 𝑘. Nodes have the
same probabilities of requesting new routes at any instant.
The routes between these nodes are initially generated by the
Dijkstra algorithm [38] before our algorithms are carried out.
The traffic loads of the routes are randomly and uniformly
distributed within [0, 1]. The simulations run in a computer
with 32GBRAMand 6 cores of Intel XeonCPU.We use IBM-
CPLEX to solve linear programming problems.
We assume that adversaries can identify strategically
important nodes by monitoring historically accumulative
traffic of the nodes. Dynamic eavesdropping or intercep-
tion is considered where, after every interval of monitor-
ing, the eavesdropper acquires network information and
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Figure 4: Results of four algorithms that we proposed, with and
without QoS constraints.The networks are all generated as 6-regular
graph with 50 nodes. The probability of initiating requests is 10%.
There are 5000 instants and 50 rounds of iterations.
updates the identification of targets accordingly. Under this
eavesdropping model, we consider different numbers of
nodes that the eavesdroppers can identify and the upper
bound of traffic difference that eavesdroppers use to identify
strategically important nodes. The upper bound reflects the
eavesdropping capability and therefore is referred to as “node
interception probability.” We also consider different time
intervals for the eavesdroppings.
The performance of the algorithms are measured by two
metrics.
(1) Coefficient of Variation (CV). Amore disperse distribution
of traffic can facilitate eavesdroppers recognizing heavily
loaded nodes in network. Coefficient of variation is a metric
to evaluate the dispersion of distribution, which is defined as
the ratio of standard deviation 𝜎 to the mean 𝜇,
𝑐V = 𝜎𝜇 . (12)
(2) The Percentage of Traffic That Bypasses Any Node Being
Eavesdropped or Monitored. Figure 4 compares the CV of
accumulated traffic between the proposed Algorithms 1, 2,
3, and 4, in a 50-node network with topology of 6-regular
graph. The CV changes as the time elapses. In Algorithms
2 and 4, different upper bounds of QoS constraints are
considered, that is, 1, 2, and 3 in number of nodes. We
see that after routes mutations, the network and variations
exhibit significantly reduced variance of accumulative traffic.
In otherwords, the difference of traffic loads among the nodes
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Figure 5: Results of Algorithms 2 and 4; random route mutation
methods proposed in [6]. The configurations of this simulation are
the same as Figure 4.
fast diminishes. Moreover, with the increasing upper bounds
of QoS constraints, Algorithm 2 approaches Algorithm 1.
Figure 5 compares Algorithms 2 and 4. For comparison
purpose, we also simulate the random route mutation pro-
posed in [6]. Two cases are considered. The first case is to
choose the optimal combination of routes to minimize the
CV of traffic at any instant, referred to as “RRM-O.” The
second case is to randomly choose routes as long as the QoS
requirements are met and therefore referred to as “RRM-
R.” Clearly, RRM-O is optimal in the sense of minimized
CV of accumulative traffic. Unfortunately, RRM-O requires
exhaustive search of all possible combinations of routes, with
a prohibitive complexity. Figure 5 also demonstrates that
Algorithm 2 outperforms Algorithm 4 and RRM-R. This is
due to the fact that Algorithm 2 carefully designs the routes
in a structured way to reduce the CV, where RRM-R does not.
Table 1 shows the average running time for each instant of
the proposed algorithms with 50-node 6-regular graph, and
the probability to request new routes is 10%. In this table, |j|
represents the length of detour j, that is, the upper bound
of QoS. As Algorithms 1 and 3 are designed without QoS
constraints, wemarked their |j| as \. Comparing the proposed
heuristic methods with the method of [6], Table 1 shows
that the increase of the upper bounds of QoS constraints has
less influence on our algorithms. RRM-R degrades, when the
length of a detour increases from a single hop to two hops.
Here, we only plot the tightest QoS constraints of RRM-O in
Table 1. This is because the complexity of RRM-O becomes
too high to be practical, when the maximum allowed detour
length is longer than (𝐿 + 1) hops.
Table 1: Average computational time for different algorithms.
Algorithms |j| Computational time (s)
Algorithm 1 \ 0.4870
Algorithm 2 3 0.5370
Algorithm 2 2 0.2826
Algorithm 2 1 0.1132
Algorithm 3 \ 0.0775
Algorithm 4 3 0.1048
Algorithm 4 2 0.0218
Algorithm 4 1 0.0190
RRM-O 1 0.0363
RRM-R 3 0.2379
RRM-R 2 0.0518
RRM-R 1 0.0131
Asmentioned in Section 3, the eavesdroppers can identify
nodes by the differences of accumulative traffic. Figure 6
plots the distribution of “safe” traffic, that is, the traffic
that does not pass through any compromised node, under
the aforementioned dynamic interception model. In this
figure, Algorithm 4 with the constraints of QoS of one-hop
increment performs worst. This is because the first step of
computing the traffic value to move, as given by (8a), (8b),
(8c), and (8d), overlooks flows. As a result, a scenario that, for
any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑦∗𝑖j , there is no detour, that is, j, to move, may occur.
When the number of flows increases, for example, the curve
of “Algorithm 4-QoS 3” in Figure 6, the probability of flows
to move also increases. Therefore it can outperform RRM-R
with the upper bound of QoS constraint is three hops, that
is, the line of “RRM-R-QoS 3.” We can also conclude from
this figure that the results of this metric are consistent with
Figure 5.
Figure 7 shows the convergent variance for networks
with increasing numbers of nodes. The topologies of the
networks are 5-regular random graphs. Each line in Figure 7
corresponds to a different probability that nodes are assigned
as sources or destinations for some route. We see that, with
the increasing network size and the increasing number of
routes to mutate, the difference of nodes traffic becomes
smaller. Algorithm 3 increasingly approaches Algorithm 1.
In other words, the low-complexity heuristic, Algorithm 4,
becomes increasingly robust against eavesdroppings.
Figure 8 shows the convergent CV in the networks with
different connectivities.The probability of nodes initiating or
receiving routing requests is all set to be 10%. Each line corre-
sponds to the nodes having the same degree. As the network
size gets larger, the difference of nodes traffic reduces. Figure 9
shows the CV of 40 nodes with connectivities of 3, 4, 5, and
6, respectively.With the increasing of network connectivities,
there are more available detours to move to for sources, and
the variations are getting smaller.
Figure 10 shows the average running time of the algo-
rithms corresponding to Figure 7. As compared with RRM,
our proposed algorithms are far more tolerant against the
growth of the network size. As a matter of fact, the con-
vergence time of the proposed algorithms remains almost
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Figure 7: Results of Algorithms 1 and 3 with different networks and
different probabilities to choose nodes, where the connectivities of
networks are all five.
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Figure 8: Results of Algorithms 1 and 3 with different sizes of
networks and different connectivities.
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Figure 9: Results of Algorithms 1 and 3 with 40 nodes and different
connectivities.
unchanged, as the network grows. In contrast, the RRM
algorithms suffer from exponentially increasing complexity
and convergence delay. Our methods are time efficient and
suitable to larger-scale networks.
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Figure 10: Computational time of algorithms that have QoS con-
straints limitation. The upper bound of QoS constraints is one hop.
The probability of nodes to request routes is 20%.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a node-centric route mutation
method which interprets route mutation as a signature
matching problem. A three-dimensional EMD model is
formulated to match signatures. By this means, routes are
mutated by increasingly taking detours, balancing historically
accumulated traffic among switches. Heuristic approaches
are also developed to significantly reduce the computational
complexities of signature matching, enhancing the scalability
of route mutation to defend large-scale SDNs. Simulation
results show that our methods can disguise strategically
located, important switches and increase the difficulties for
eavesdroppers to identify the switches, thereby delaying or
preventing malicious attacks. Significantly reduced complex-
ities also indicate the suitability of our algorithms to large-
scale networks.
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